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Background: Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is one of the greatest threats in 21st century medicine. AMR
has been characterized as a social dilemma. A familiar version describes the situation in which a col-
lective resource (in this case, antibiotic efficacy) is exhausted due to over-exploitation. The dilemma
arises because individuals are motivated to maximize individual payoffs, although the collective outcome
is worse if all act in this way.
Objectives: We aim to outline the implications for antimicrobial stewardship of characterizing antibiotic
overuse as a social dilemma.
Sources: We conducted a narrative review of the literature on interventions to promote the conservation
of resources in social dilemmas.
Content: The social dilemma of antibiotic over-use is complicated by the lack of visibility and imminence
of AMR, a loose coupling between individual actions and the outcome of AMR, and the agency re-
lationships inherent in the prescriber role. We identify seven strategies for shifting prescriber behaviour
and promoting a focus on the collectively desirable outcome of conservation of antibiotic efficacy: (1)
establish clearly defined boundaries and access rights; (2) raise the visibility and imminence of the
problem; (3) enable collective choice arrangements; (4) conduct behaviour-based monitoring; (5) use
social and reputational incentives and sanctions; (6) address misalignment of goals and incentives; and
(7) provide conflict resolution mechanisms.
Implications: We conclude that this theoretic analysis of antibiotic stewardship could make the problem
of optimizing antibiotic prescribing more tractable, providing a theory base for intervention develop-
ment. C. Tarrant, Clin Microbiol Infect 2019;25:1356
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of European Society of Clinical Microbiology
and Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).Conserving scarce resources in antimicrobial prescribing
The over-use of antibiotics is a global problem with potentially
catastrophic consequences [1,2]. All antibiotic use promotes the
development of antibiotic resistance (AMR), with the associated
risk of bacterial infections becoming untreatable with existing an-
tibiotics. Very few new antibiotic agents are being discovered and
approved [3]. As a result, antimicrobial efficacy can be viewed as acester, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK.
r Ltd on behalf of European Society
es/by/4.0/).resource which, at best, is only partially renewable. The potential
for antibiotic overuse to result in a tragedy of the commons e a
situation where individual self-interest drives overconsumption of
a common-pool resource, and ultimately future exhaustion of the
resource e has been widely recognized [4e9]. Conserving the
common-pool resource of antimicrobial efficacy, through opti-
mizing the use of available antibiotic resources and reducing
excessive use, is now a vital concern. Despite the pressing need for
conservative antibiotic use, over-use of antibiotics across human
and animal healthcare and agriculture prevails [10]. In healthcare,
wide variations in patterns of antibiotic prescribing exist, includingof Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under
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These disparities are unlikely to be fully explained by differences in
case mix and infection prevalence, but reflect variation in pre-
scribing practices and stewardship activities. Resistance levels also
vary significantly between countries [12], likely resulting, in part,
from variations in antimicrobial stewardship and infection control
practices. Addressing the growing problem of resistance will
require an understanding of the social and behavioural drivers of
antibiotic overuse [13] to inform the design and implementation of
interventions to optimize practice.
Theory-based interventions for managing common-pool
resources
Characterizing the task of optimizing antibiotic use as a problem
of managing a common-pool resource provides the foundation for
theory-based interventions. One type of theory-based approach is
to restrict or control access to the resource [14]; in the case of
antibiotic stewardship in healthcare, this includes interventions
such as the use of antibiotic access codes, mandatory sign-off by
microbiology services, user fees or ‘Pigovian tax’ [15], and stew-
ardship ward rounds to monitor and correct prescribing choices
[16]. Restrictive stewardship interventions can be effective, but
overall the results have been variable [17]. Restrictive strategies
have limitations because they rarely change social norms or ‘pre-
scribing etiquette’ [18] and can be damaging to relationships be-
tween healthcare staff [19,20]. If imposed by an authority (e.g.
hospital management), restrictive interventions can also under-
mine a sense of collective ownership of decision makers [19], and
result in staff working to resist or circumvent the restrictions [21].
Instead, collective and cooperative approaches are widely
acknowledged to be more effective approaches for managing
common-pool resources [22]. Eleanor Ostrom's seminal work
suggests that conservation can be promoted through defining the
resource at stake and making its depletion visible; creating local
consensus-based access rules; and reinforcing sustainable behav-
iour through sharing information about resource consumption and
using social and reputational incentives and sanctions (Table 1). An
example of this approach is the recent highly successful water
preservation campaign during severe draught in Cape Town, South
Africa [23]. This campaign raised visibility of its depletion of water
supplies through publicizing a ‘Day Zero’ datewhen taps would run
dry. It stipulated collectively reinforced solutions such as clearly
defined, water-saving behaviours (e.g. time-limited showers).
Levels of consumptionwere monitored, and social and reputational
sanctions applied through publishing household-specific mea-
surements of water use. Approaches to tackling the global problemTable 1
Theory-based strategies for managing a common-pool resource (CPR) based on Ostrom
Classes of theory-based intervention Description of intervention
Clearly defined boundaries Individuals or households who have righ
boundaries of the CPR itself.
Congruence between appropriation and
provision rules and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, plac
to provision rules requiring labour, mate
Collective-choice arrangements Most individuals affected by the operatio
Monitoring Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditi
appropriators.
Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate operational ru
and context of the offense) by other appr
Conflict resolution mechanisms Appropriators and their officials have rap
between appropriators and officials.
Minimal recognition of rights to
organize
The rights of appropriators to devise the
Nested enterprises (only for CPRs that
are parts of larger systems)
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enf
layers of nested enterprises.of plastic pollution also provide examples of the types of solution
that can promote large-scale cooperation towards a collectively
optimal outcome: in this case, that of protecting the environment
from the damaging effects of over-reliance on plastic. The behav-
iour of individual users and organizations has been targeted
through regulation and financial disincentives, but perhaps more
importantly through raising visibility and shifting social norms.
Emotive images [24] have emphasized the scale and imminence of
the problem, and campaigns have capitalized on the power of
commitment to a collective goal [25] coupled with clear actions.
Furthermore, reputational effects are being used as a lever for
change: through ‘public shaming’ [26,27] and through opening up
the possibility for individuals and organizations to boost their
reputations and gain social rewards by eschewing plastic.
While these examples demonstrate effective approaches to
reducing over-consumption and protecting a common pool
resource, it is unclear whether antibiotic overuse is amenable to the
same types of collective solutions. Different resource dilemmas are
characterized by unique features which may complicate successful
interventions and require adaptation of strategies [28,29]. Three
particular features of the problem of antibiotic overuse have im-
plications for the development of collectively based solutions.
Lack of visibility and imminence
In many social dilemmas, individuals frequently ignore the costs
they impose on society, because these costs are invisible and diffuse
[15]. This problem is amplified in the case of AMR, where the
depletion of the commons is not immediately visible [30] and the
likely scope of the tragedy remains unclear in terms of the trajec-
tory towards catastrophic resistance levels [6]. While the rapid
depletion of water resources and the damage to the environment
from plastics are easily revealed to the general population, levels of
antibiotic resistance in local populations are difficult to make
visible, and are often not apparent to doctors in their daily practice
or of concern to lay people. Insidious onset of incremental resis-
tance numbs prescribers to the impending catastrophe of pan-drug
resistance. Furthermore, future needs for antibiotics to fight in-
fections are stochastic and cannot be quantified or predicted with
certainty [33]. The loss of antibiotic efficacy is commonly perceived
to be a vague and distant threat [19,20,34].
Problem of many hands
Additionally, although the responsibility for the problem of AMR
is collective, each individual's contribution to the problem is min-
imal and probabilistic. AMR can be characterized as a ‘problem of(1990)
ts to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the
e, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and
rial, and/or money.
nal rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
ons and ‘appropriate behaviour’, are accountable to the appropriators or are the
les are likely to be subject to graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness
opriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
id access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or
ir own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.
orcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple
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for collective outcomes is blurred [35,36] Practitioners tend to
downplay the risk of AMR in relation to their individual prescribing
decisions and their own organization, and to characterize it as a
problem caused by others [31,37,38]. The problem of many hands is
particularly severe in the context of AMR, because a prescriber's
actions are only loosely coupled [39] to the problem of resistance. In
the example of water conservation, an individual's over-
consumption of water directly contributes to depletion at local
community level, and both individual consumption and depletion
of resource can be easily measured (e.g. through reduced reservoir
water levels). Similarly, any use of plastic can be directly linked to
the problem of plastic pollution. In contrast, due to variable quality
of systems for recording and monitoring prescribing, the mea-
surement of antibiotic use can be problematic [40,41], and the
complexity of AMR makes it difficult, but not impossible [42], to
link individual prescribing behaviour to local resistance levels.
More broadly, in dilemmas such as water conservation, there are
direct trade-offs involveddhigher water use in the short runmeans
lower availability of water in the long run. In contrast, the nature of
the trade-off between the use of antimicrobials now and resistance
rates later is poorly understood. The complex biology of resistance,
particularly multidrug resistance, means that use of one antibiotic
class may promote resistance to another class (e.g. the use of co-
trimoxazole use associated with increased carriage of penicillin-
resistant Streptococcus pneumonia) [43].Agency relationships in antibiotic prescribing
A further feature complicating the AMR dilemma is the nature of
the agency relationships [44] involved in antibiotic prescribing. In
most countries, rather than all consumers being able to freely ac-
cess the common-pool resource of antibiotics, doctors control ac-
cess through their prescribing privileges. As such, doctors are the
primary target of antimicrobial stewardship interventions that aim
to protect the interests of society for conservation of antibiotic ef-
ficacy. This can, however, be in tension with doctors' primary role,
to act as agents for their individual patients in making treatment
decisions. These different roles of doctors create a problem of
‘double-agency’ [45], which introduces a conflict of interest and
ultimately creates a ‘moral hazard’ [46e48] that impacts on their
role as antibiotic stewards. Doctors have rational and ethical rea-
sons for privileging their patient's interests over those of society
[5,49]: their professional duty is first and foremost the care of their
individual patients [50]. Doctors' interests are aligned with
achieving positive outcomes for the patients they treat, and this can
be reinforced by reputational, and sometimes financial, implica-
tions of negative patient outcomes [34,51e53]. Where stewardship
involves adhering to good practice, such as following prescribing
guidelines, this is relatively unproblematic in moral and ethical
terms, although under conditions of uncertainty the interests of
individual patients are likely to win out resulting in over-
prescribing. If, however, stewardship becomes extended to with-
holding antibiotics when benefits are not deemed sufficient to
incur the cost of contributing to resistance, serious ethical chal-
lenges arise for prescribers [54]. In contrast to some other types of
resource dilemmas, efforts to conserve antibiotics are less about
controlling wilful individuals who are selfishly overconsuming or
depleting a resource, and more about addressing the moral and
ethical tensions that arise for prescribers in acting as agents for
multiple parties, whose interests may not be fully aligned [44]. As
has been acknowledged, guidelines and policy on antimicrobial
stewardship fail on the whole to address the moral and ethical
questions around antimicrobial stewardship, including whetherprescribers should prioritize collective over individual interests,
and under what circumstances [54].
Optimizing antibiotic prescribing in healthcare: adapted
social dilemma interventions
Characterizing antibiotic stewardship as a social dilemma, with
consideration of the specific features already described, provides
the basis for more sophisticated theory-based interventions to help
conserve antibiotic efficacy as a common good. We have identified
seven recommendations for an integrated, theory-based approach
to optimizing antibiotic prescribing (Table 2): (1) establish clearly
defined boundaries and access rights; (2) raise the visibility and
highlight imminence of the problem; (3) enable collective-choice
arrangements; (4) conduct behaviour-based monitoring; (5) use
social and reputational incentives and sanctions; (6) address
misalignment of goals and incentives; and (7) provide conflict
resolution mechanisms.
Establish clearly defined boundaries and access rights
Ostrom [22] emphasized the importance of defining the
resource to be protected and the stakeholders able to access it. It is
indeed crucial to ensure that only trained staff with prescribing
rights can access antibiotics; this is a significant problem in con-
trolling the commons in many low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs). Even in settings where access is limited by prescribing
rights, doctors are often ill-equipped to make decisions in line with
preserving antibiotic commons; many frontline prescribers are
relatively junior [55] and have little training specifically on anti-
biotic use [5]. There may be a case for making access to antibiotics
dependent on attaining additional qualifications in antibiotic pre-
scribing and AMR. A more controversial option would be to restrict
antibiotic prescribing privileges to specialist prescribers, indepen-
dent of individual patients' care teams, whowould be better able to
objectively balance short-term interests of individual patients
against longer-term interests of society [56]. However, this option
would be dependent on the availability of expert prescribers at any
time of the day [57].
In addition to ensuring qualification of agents, there is a need to
clarify their respective obligations to different principles [40].
Contracts offer one avenue to clarify the expectations of prescribers
as agents for society [58] as well as for individual patients [59].
Requirements to cooperate with antimicrobial stewardship guide-
lines could be included in prescribers' contracts with their
employing organization. Ensuring that regulatory and professional
standards specify a duty to protect public health and the future
interests of society would also support the development of clear
contractual expectations of engagement with antimicrobial
stewardship.
Raise visibility and imminence
Making the state of the commons visible to the agents who are
responsible for using it is an important element in controlling over-
consumption. Any restrictions or voluntary limitations on antibiotic
prescribing are more likely to be accepted if individuals are
convinced that antibiotic efficiency is indeed under threat, and that
antimicrobial resistance is a near and imminent danger [22]. Col-
lecting data on resistance levels, and highlighting patterns of
growing resistance as well as patterns of treatment failure [60] to
clinician prescribers, is crucial for creating a sense of urgency. This
strategy would be dependent on ensuring quality and consistency
in sampling, testing, and reporting. The developing global infra-
structure for surveillance of resistance could be harnessed to raise
Table 2





1. Establish clearly defined
boundaries and access rights
- Define the common resource that needs protecting (e.g. all antibiotic drugs).
- Fully specify who can access antibiotics (e.g. fully-trained doctors; microbiologists, antimicrobial pharmacists), and whether
this differs between different types of antibiotics: this turns a resource from ‘open-access’ into a ‘common-property’.
- Enforce formal training requirements for antibiotic prescribers to ensure they are fully qualified to make difficult antibiotic
prescribing choices.
- Ensure prescribers' duty to society and their responsibility for protecting antibiotic efficacy is explicit in formal contracts and
professional codes.
2. Raise the problem's visibility
and highlight imminence
- Collect and communicate information about local resistance levels.
- Establish a consensus amongst agents about the threat posed by AMR and the need to act.
- Increase a sense of urgency by highlighting existing treatment complications and demonstrating the imminence of AMR.
3. Make collective choice
arrangements
- Ensure rules about antibiotic prescribing are consensus-based, incorporating views of different stakeholders; use commitment
based strategies to support implementation
- Ensure that external authorities (e.g. government) respect local, consensus-based rules about antibiotic prescribing.
- Fit prescribing rules to the local context, considering for example local resistance levels, hygiene and sanitation, and overall
infection rates, and the local challenges and resources of individual hospitals or healthcare organizations.
- Ensure all parts of the system have appropriate antibiotic prescribing guidelines and decision-support tools and there is
communication and consensus across different parts of the system.
- Create structures for collective decision-making, particularly for non-hospital based prescribers
4. Conduct behaviour-based
monitoring
- Monitor against collectively agreed rules or guidelines
- Set up systems to collect and make transparent information on overall prescribing levels and individual prescriber habits.
- Enable behaviour-based monitoring by members of the prescribing community and the officials to whom they are
accountable, placing the emphasis on prescribing choices of individual healthcare staff rather than their (loosely coupled)
outcomes (i.e. hard-to-measure increases of AMR).
5 Use social and reputational
incentives and sanctions
- Use graduated sanctions matched to scale and frequency of inappropriate behaviours
- Make use of social and reputational incentives and sanctions, for example through individual and organizational awards for
cooperative action, and reputational sanctions for non-engagement with consensus rules.
- Capitalize on the power of social norm feedback
6. Address misaligned goals
and incentives
- Identify and address organizational and national goals and incentives that are in tension with stewardship
- Manage risks for doctors of acting in the interests of society, e.g. through organizational protection from litigation
7. Provide conflict resolution
mechanisms
- Ensure arrangements are in place to resolve conflicts about antibiotic prescribing (e.g. disputes about appropriate treatment in
situations of uncertainty).
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resistance data may have more immediate impact in promoting a
‘recognition of necessity’ for action [57]. Access to data on local
resistance patterns has been recognized as a key element of anti-
microbial stewardship strategies [61]; this is not only important for
informing local recommendations and guidelines for antibiotic
choice, but also potentially for being used purposefully to amplify
[62] the threat posed by AMR. Raising awareness of resistance rates
may not be unproblematic, for example prescribers may react by
over-using broad-spectrum antimicrobials. Monitoring unintended
consequences of any such intervention would be important. Addi-
tionally, given that impact on mortality rates is only likely to be
visible when multidrug resistance rates reach a very high level, the
impact of resistance reportingmay decline over time if providers do
not see a direct link between resistance and mortality rates.
Enable collective-choice arrangements
Social dilemmas may be best managed through collective ap-
proaches. Making collective-choice agreements requires small
communities to work together to establish shared goals and to
develop consensus-based rules, which all agree to abide by and to
enforce: commitment-based strategies may be particularly valu-
able in supporting this [63]. Given the tension between potential
dangers to current patients if antibiotics are withheld, and the need
to protect future patients from the harm arising from excessive
antibiotic use, rules should be designed to reflect ethical principles
about the rights of current and future patients and the moral duty
to preserve antibiotics [64,65]. All individuals affected by the rules
of antibiotic prescribing should be involved in designing the rules
irrespective of existing hierarchies [22]. Rules instated by central
authorities (e.g. international organizations, governments orhospital trusts) can be valuable but need local adaptation with
input from representative stakeholders; external authorities must
respect local, consensus-based rules about antibiotic prescribing
[22]. Prescribing rules should be designed to reflect the challenges
[57] and resources of local communities, e.g. infection rates, sani-
tation, local AMR, and financial capacities and access to antibiotics,
and their implementation supported by adequate access to di-
agnostics. Communities affected by antibiotic prescribing rules are
nested and overlapping: hospitals, GP practices, pharmacies, and
patients are all stakeholders and need to convene to enable coor-
dination of action.
Collective choice agreements, once made, must be consistently
implemented. Rather than relying on (often junior) doctors tomake
value judgements on an individual patient basis, in time pressured
and demanding circumstances, approaches such as consensus
guidelines and decision support systems could be used more
consistently to support decision making [64]. Efforts to provide
more opportunity for collective decision-making would also be
helpful in supporting coordinated action, as well as removing some
of the pressure inherent in the agency relationship. In hospitals
decisions are more likely to involve input from a multidisciplinary
team, whereas those working in the community may have less
opportunity to discuss their decision-making and gain advice and
support from colleagues.
Conduct behaviour-based monitoring
Enabling a community to self-monitor and correct one another's
behaviour is a key element of effective collective-choice systems
[6,11]. Monitoring both the conditions of the common-pool
resource (levels of resistance [5]) and ‘appropriate behaviour’,
and sharing this information with the community of prescribers, is
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against collectively agreed rules or guidelines (e.g. as provided by
the ‘Start smart then focus’ guidance [66] in the UK). Those involved
in monitoring the use of the resource and holding others
accountable should themselves be members of the community
who are using the resource (i.e. should be members of the clinical
community) [11].
For individuals to be willing to cooperate in conserving re-
sources, they need to be assured that others are also invested in
cooperation. Worries concerning the existence of selfish ‘free-rid-
ers’ who benefit from others' judicial use of antibiotics while
making no effort to optimize their own prescribing could lead to a
break-down of mutual cooperation [57]. Sharing information about
improved prescribing patterns could help individuals to be opti-
mistic that others are also reducing their antibiotic use, and to be
more confident that their own contribution is worthwhile [67].
Use social and reputational incentives and sanctions
The effectiveness of collective choice arrangements is depen-
dent on mechanisms for rewarding or sanctioning behaviour. Pay-
for-performance schemes offer a centrally administered means of
rewarding practitioners for meeting objectives around optimizing
antibiotic use, but evidence for effectiveness is mixed and their use
is not unproblematic [68]. Basing sanctions and rewards on repu-
tation as opposed to financial reward [69e71] seems a particularly
promising avenue. Reputation has been compared to a type of
currency in social interactions; the ability to develop a positive
reputation based on cooperative behaviour constitutes a powerful
reward [69] in most cultural contexts [4]. Harnessing reputation
effects among doctors could play an important role in controlling
antibiotic prescribing [4,6]. Positive reputational incentivesdsuch
as recognizing and celebrating individuals for conservative pre-
scribing [57]dcan help motivate individuals to cooperate, and
create ‘role models’ for judicious prescribing. Reputational effects
may be even more effective when targeted at ward or organiza-
tional level [4] (such as ranking organizations or using awards to
recognize collective good practice [67]).
Reputation could also be harnessed as a means of sanction [4]:
currently, there exist minimal reputational risks of over-prescribing
[72]. Public shaming and consequent normative pressure have been
demonstrated to be highly effective [4]: the publication of house-
holdwater usage in Cape Town reducedwater consumption by over
a half [73]. Furthermore, as described earlier, public shaming plays
a role in efforts to reduce plastic use. This strategy is more difficult
to implement in relation to antibiotic use, particularly due to dif-
ficulties in identifying levels of ‘inappropriate prescribing’,
although there is some evidence that public reporting of antibiotic
prescribing levels can promote reductions in prescribing [74,75]. A
closely related, and less ethically problematic, technique is the use
of social norm feedback [76,77].
Address misalignment of goals and incentives
The utility structure for doctors around antibiotic prescribing
frequently reinforces a tendency towards over-use. Perverse in-
centives exist, most obviously in private healthcare settings
where financial incentives for antibiotic use can be significant
[78], but also in relation to the influence of pharmaceutical
companies [79] particularly in LMICs. There may also be more
subtle and indirect influences of outcome data such as infection
rates, mortality, and length of stay statistics on over-reliance on
antibiotics [80,81]. Incentives and sanctions should be designed
to achieve the desired outcome in terms of stewardship behav-
iour, to avoid ‘the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B’ [82].Ensuring clarity of organizational objectives and goals, actively
managing multiple directives, targets, initiatives and guidelines
(both at organizational and national level) to reduce tensions
with stewardship aims, tackling perverse incentives (including
those that arise through pharmaceutical company activities) [83],
and ensuring doctors are protected when they make active de-
cisions not to prescribe antibiotics [84] will be critical in reducing
goal conflict for doctors.
Establish conflict resolution mechanisms
Any rules or guidelines are subject to individual interpretation,
resulting in potential for disagreements between different
healthcare professionals. It is therefore crucial that appropriate
institutions or arrangements are in place to resolve disputes
about appropriate antibiotic prescribing [22]. Smaller disagree-
ments could be resolved during regular meetings of antibiotic
stewardship committees including experienced representatives
from different healthcare professions. More serious or recurrent
conflict might require escalation to a hospital court system, which
could be established based on existing medical management
structures [6].
Conclusions
AMR presents a severe threat to society: without antibiotics, we
face a future in which minor infections could be fatal, common
surgical procedures would become too risky, and deadly diseases
could wipe out significant numbers of the population globally.
Over-use of antibiotics in medicine contributes to the development
and spread of resistance, and effective antimicrobial stewardship is
critical in the fight to preserve this precious resource.
Stewardship interventions should draw on theory-based ap-
proaches for managing a common-pool resource, as demon-
strated in interventions to tackle other resource dilemmas
including drought and environmental pollution. These include
establishing clearly defined boundaries, access rights and re-
sponsibilities of those who control access to the resource, and
raising the problem's visibility. Developing consensus-based
rules [85,86] around limiting antibiotic use, enabling the com-
munity of prescribers to self-monitor through sharing of data on
prescribing levels, and using social and reputational rewards and
sanctions [57] may enhance current approaches to conserving
antibiotics. Alongside this, misaligned goals and incentives need
to be addressed, and local mechanisms for conflict resolution
established. Developing a better understanding of the nature of
the trade-offs involved in the dilemma will inform decisions
about how far stewardship should go in restricting current
antibiotic use in order to achieve (uncertain) future gains [5].
Establishing ethical principles for stewardship to minimize the
risk of harm to current patients will be important to underpin
these strategies.
Table 3 provides an overview of possibilities for implementing
these strategies in England. While each type of strategy potentially
has value in its own right, most impact is likely to be gained by
developing a coordinated programme specifically designed to
enable cooperative collective action to optimize antibiotic use. The
successful Swedish STRAMA model is a good example of such a
programme, incorporating a decentralized organizational model,
local adaptation of guidelines and initiatives, awareness-raising for
patients and health professionals, and monitoring and sharing of
data on resistance levels and antibiotic use [87].
Insight into the cultural and contextual differences between
countries that shape the nature of the dilemma, and impact on
delivery of and engagement with stewardship programmes, will
Table 3




Example potential actions in England
1. Establish clearly defined
boundaries and access rights
- National policy: require doctors to hold a qualification to prescribe antibiotics (e.g. based on European work to identify
competencies required for antibiotic prescribers1).
- Healthcare organizations: adhere to CQUIN guidelines stipulating senior doctors review of antibiotic prescriptions.2
- Healthcare organizations: include requirements to cooperate with antimicrobial stewardship guidelines in doctors'
contracts.
- GMC (regulatory body): ensure that professional standards specify doctors' duty to protecting public health and the future
interests of society.
2 Raise the problem's visibility
and highlight imminence
- Public health bodies: re-frame information about AMR in messages targeting the public and health professionals to avoid
presenting as a vague future risk; instead use real cases and show graphics of the scale of the problem of growth and
spread of resistance, e.g.3
- Professional bodies: establish consensus statements for action on antibiotic over-use.
3. Make collective choice
arrangements
- Improvement bodies (e.g. NHS Improvement): support the use of collaborative approaches to improving antibiotic use
(e.g. clinical community-type approaches).4 Bring together local communities of stakeholders to participate in a
consensus-building process to translate national action plans into local goals, e.g.5
- Healthcare organizations: develop and use locally adapted national prescribing guidelines, e.g.6
- Community prescribers: initiate platforms for collective decision-making (online or group based).
4. Conduct behaviour-based
monitoring
- Healthcare organizations: engage prescribers in collectively auditing their own practice against best practice auditing
tools, e.g.7
- Healthcare organizations: consider implementing electronic monitoring and feedback systems for antibiotic prescribing.8
5. Use social and reputational
incentives and sanctions
- Healthcare organizations: provide benchmarked feedback to prescribers/teams on their prescribing; initiate awards for
good performance.
- Healthcare organizations: provide frameworks, guidance and training to support staff to question and challenge others on
their prescribing decisions.
- Senior doctors: recognize and celebrate conservative prescribing decisions by colleagues.
- National bodies: recognize organizational high performance, e.g. Antibiotic guardian awards.9
6. Address misaligned goals
and incentives
- Improvement bodies (e.g. NHS Improvement): review targets and incentive schemes to avoid tensions (e.g. between
CQUINs for sepsis prevention and CQUINs for antibiotic protection).
- Healthcare organizations: integrate delivery of infection control and antimicrobial stewardship initiatives (e.g. through a
single team); check for unintended consequences of initiatives.
- Healthcare organizations: encourage full documentation of prescribing decisions including decisions not to prescribe;
ensure doctors are confident that conservative prescribing decisions will be defended by their employing organization.
7. Provide conflict resolution
mechanisms
- Healthcare organizations/national bodies: develop guidance in clinical conflict resolution and plan for local
implementation.10
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tion, to ensure they are context specific [88,89]. Any efforts to
optimize antibiotic use need to be closely coupled with infection
prevention strategies, to reduce the need to call on the antibiotic
commons [90]. Ultimately, the challenge of antimicrobial stew-
ardship may prove to be more tractable than expected, provided
that the dynamics of the social dilemma involved are taken into
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